Initial public offerings are a dying breed, a phenomenon that has attracted recent attention, especially given the fire hose of emerging tech-related start-ups, The real losers are ordinary investors.

For decades, individuals have participated in the fastest growth segments of the economy by making stock investments through their pension plans, 401(k) accounts and mutual funds. The underlying owners of the majority of these assets are households and individuals.

Once upon a time, high-growth tech companies sought capital by offering ownership to the public rather than to a select group of elite private investors, and this lifted the fortunes of regular people. I know this first hand. My mother, a social worker, contributed monthly to her retirement account, which was mostly invested in Fidelity’s Magellan Fund. That was no accident. When she was first allowed a choice, I was working for Peter Lynch, who managed Magellan. When she died, almost 20 years ago, the assets in her account had growth extraordinarily, thanks in large part to many stellar stocks that we bought as IPOs or small-caps.

Consider that between 1995 and 1999, there were a total of 768 tech IPO’s, an average of 153 per year, including household names like Amazon, eBay and Yahoo. By contrast, during the most recent five-year time period, there have been a total of 106 technology IPOs, an average of only 21 a year.

Until a decade ago, the goal of a successful tech start-up was to go public, which would raise additional funds for expansion and allow the founders and early investors to recoup some of their, money hopefully at a nice profit. Today’s new companies don’t need or even want the public’s money.

Before rolling out of bed, a start-up CEO may find a line outside his or her door of willing private investors with very deep pockets. There is so much available capital from venture capital, private equity, sovereign wealth funds, enormously rich angel investors and tech behemoths like Alphabet, Facebook and Apple, that even juvenile firms with substantial burn rates can avoid the arduous process of a filing, road show, pricing, and the agony or ecstasy of spending innumerable hours with Wall Street bankers.

As shown in the chart below, venture capital funds alone raised over $84 billion in 2017, far above the levels gathered in the last peak, prior to the recession.

With young companies staying private, accompanied by the natural attrition from mergers and acquisitions, the number of public companies has shrunk over the past decade. In 1996, there were 7,322 companies listed on the NYSE, and today there are only 3,671. The average age of listed companies has risen 50 percent in 20 years, from 12 to 18 years old. How has this erosion affected millions of U.S. investors?

Reviewing the composition of the Technology SPDR ETF (XLK) over time reveals that 64 percent of the current 72 holdings, representing the largest tech stocks in the sector, were not in the index 20 years ago.That means they were either too small in 1998 or not yet public.The total return of this ETF over the past 10 years is 247 percent, far exceeding the S&P 500’s gain of 154 percent. Therefore, one can infer that the inclusion of fast growing innovators, such as Facebook, Alphabet, or Salesforce.com has factored meaningfully into that superior return.

The next table compares the 20-year performance of the Russell 2000, an index heavily weighted toward smaller market caps, to the S&P 500, which it handily beats.

Source: FactSet

Some argue that if young, innovative firms are acquired by the large platform giants, such as Facebook, Google, or Apple, the public would continue to benefit by owning the parent stock. However, the impact of a small add-on acquisition to a stock valued at hundreds of billions of dollars is, by definition, less powerful than if that company remained independent, at least for several more years.

If the average American suffers from the lack of IPOs, how can we correct this problem? One suggestion is easier access or lower minimums for venture capital and private equity funds, but illiquidity and complex fund structures complicate this option. Policy makers should focus on simplifying the public filing regulatory hurdles.

It’s very possible that the real catalyst will be the unraveling of not only the once-high flying biotech startup Theranos but several other very high profile private companies with private valuations of over $10 billion. Would the same, possibly fraudulent, behavior have occurred at Theranos if it were public? Maybe, but it’s less likely.